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I. INTRODUCTION
Effective July 1, 2016, Tennessee enacted Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-318, entitled Unlawful Exposure.1 The new law
enshrined statutory language to prosecute nonconsensual
pornography, commonly known as “revenge porn.”
Nonconsensual pornography is the distribution of naked or
sexually-charged images of persons without their consent.2
In passing the Unlawful Exposure law, Tennessee joined the
majority of other states by recognizing the crime’s existence
and codifying elements for criminal prosecution.3 Currently,
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted
nonconsensual pornography laws.4
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-318 (2016).
Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge
Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014).
3 CCRI, 48 States + DC + Two Territories Now Have Laws against
Nonconsensual Pornography,
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/nonconsensual-pornagraphy-laws (last
visited January 15, 2022).
4 Id.
1
2
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The statutory language of Tennessee Code Annotated
Section 39-17-318 reads:
(a) A person commits unlawful exposure who,
with the intent to cause emotional distress,
distributes an image of the intimate part or
parts of another identifiable person if:
(1) The image was photographed or
recorded under circumstances
where
the
parties agreed or understood that the image
would remain private; and
(2) The person depicted in the image
suffers emotional distress.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) “Emotional distress” has the same
meaning as defined in § 39-17-315; and
(2) “Intimate part” means any portion of
the primary genital area, buttock, or any
portion of the female breast below the top of
the areola that is either uncovered or visible
through less than full opaque clothing.
(c) Nothing in this section precludes
punishment under any other section of law
providing for greater punishment.
(d) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A
misdemeanor.
Two terms are defined within the statute: “emotional
distress” and “intimate part.” Emotional distress uses the
same definition found in the Tennessee statute for Stalking
where “‘Emotional distress’ means significant mental
suffering or distress that may, but does not necessarily,
require medical or other professional treatment or
counseling.”5 Intimate parts are named as “any portion of”
the primary sexual characteristics of males and females (i.e.,
sex organs), buttocks, and female breasts “below the top of
the areola.”6
Prosecutorial problems emerged where certain
published images qualified for the spirit of the law yet did
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(2) (2018).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-318(b)(2) (2016). This phrase also appears in
legislative canon regarding “adult establishments;” see TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-4-1201 and § 57-4-204.
5
6

TENNESSEE REVENGE PORN

3

not meet the letter of the law. Two such cases presented in
the 20th Judicial District of Tennessee (Davidson County).
“Alex” was subjected to nonconsensual pornography when a
former partner distributed a picture of her anus to her family
and workplace.7 The judge expressed doubt during a
preliminary hearing that the picture met the qualification of
“identifiable person” as he believed the party must be
identifiable within the four corners of the photograph.8
Thus, the picture of a lone body part was believed by the
Assistant District Attorney handling the matter to represent
a problematic issue because the victim’s face did not appear
as an identifiable factor.9
The second case presented a reverse problem.10
“Blake” was prominently identifiable in the distributed
picture. With her knowledge, the defendant had taken a
private cell phone photo of the victim engaging in oral sex
with him. The victim’s face was in full view, along with a
portion of the defendant’s penis—however, Blake’s own
intimate parts were covered.11
The defendant openly
referred to the victim in the caption when he shared this
image via social media to his many followers. Implausibly,
sexual acts are not expressly addressed under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-318. A covered, but still identifiable, victim
engaged in sexual activity does not meet the statutory
language where his or her “intimate parts” are not strictly
visible.

II. ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions outline three
essential elements for the crime of Unlawful Exposure:
(1) Defendant intended to cause emotional
distress through distributing an image of the
Email from Sarah Wolfson-Butler, Asst. Dist. Atty., to author (Apr. 3,
2018, 15:29 CT) (on file with author).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Email from author to Sarah Wolfson-Butler, Asst. Dist. Atty. (Apr. 4,
2018, 07:49 CT) (on file with author).
11 Interview with Jude Santana, Asst. Dist. Atty., in Nashville, Tenn.
(Apr. 3, 2018).
7
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intimate part or parts of another identifiable
person; and
(2)
The
image was created under
circumstances where parties agreed or
understood the image would remain private;
and
(3) The person depicted in the image suffered
emotional distress.12

Elements (2) and (3) are relatively straightforward
and present little room for misinterpretation.
The
“emotional distress” piece of element (3) referenced in the
statute has the same meaning as in Tenn. Code Ann. § 3917-315 (Stalking).13 The “emotional distress” section of the
Stalking statute reads:
Emotional distress” means significant
mental suffering or distress that may, but does
not necessarily, require medical or other
professional treatment or counseling.14
Emotional distress is objectively measured by a
reasonable person standard and subjectively where the
victim did personally or actually experience significant
mental suffering or distress.15 As a required element for
Unlawful Exposure, the victim must establish she or he
individually suffered significant mental suffering or distress,
where the objective standard of reasonable person is largely
static.
Element (2) does not have a statutory standard
establishing under what circumstances both parties would
agree or understand such images would remain private. The
analogous nonconsensual pornography statute in Illinois
includes a reasonable person standard. It states:
A
person
commits
non-consensual
dissemination of private sexual images when
he or she:
COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTR., 7 TENN. PRAC. PATTERN JURY
INSTR., 39.09.
13 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-318 (2016).
14 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (2018).
15 State v. Flowers, 512 S.W.3d 161, 162 (Tenn. 2016).
12
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...
(2) obtains the image under circumstances in
which a reasonable person would know or
understand that the image was to remain
private; and
(3) knows or should have known that the
person in the image has not consented to the
dissemination.16
Tennessee does not include a reasonable person
standard in its Unlawful Exposure statute. Thus, a victim
must assert and articulate both parties’ expectations of
privacy to the trier of fact.
The most problematic language comes within
Element (1) where a defendant “with intent to cause
emotional distress, distributed an image of the intimate part
or parts of another identifiable person.”17 Parsing out the
specific statutory language, phrases will be addressed below,
accordingly.

A. “WITH INTENT TO CAUSE”
The word “intent” is defined within the jury
instruction. It mirrors another Tennessee criminal statute
which states:
“Intentional” means that a person acts
intentionally with respect to the nature of the
conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is
the person’s conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.18,19
Within the Unlawful Exposure statute, the above
language does not appear to address the intentional nature
in publishing the image, but rather the intentional purpose
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5 (2015).
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 12.
18 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(21) (2021).
19 The word “conscious” appears in the language for Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-11-106(a)(21). In the pattern jury instructions, the word “conscience”
appears under T.P.I.-Crim. 39.09. The two words are not analogous in
nature, rather they are homophonic. Ideally, the Tennessee General
Assembly should choose the most accurate word for their plain and
intended meaning.
16
17
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of a conscious act or desire. To wit, the intentional act is to
cause the victim emotional distress or the “revenge” piece of
“revenge porn.” As a statutory requirement to intentionally
cause emotional distress, the statute does not expressly
address otherwise-covered images where revenge is not the
motivating factor. The “revenge” part of nonconsensual
pornography acts as a scapegoat, colorizing the criminal act
with soap operatic flair. However, perpetrators of this crime
may not know the victim in any meaningful capacity, thus
rendering “revenge” as an inoperable qualifier. Amusement
or other gratification, not maliciousness, can be the
overriding factor in publishing intimate images.20 Indeed, a
survey of admitted perpetrators who disseminated sexually
explicit images without consent indicated some did so for
amusement between friends and had no collateral intention
to hurt the depicted victim.21
Requiring an intention to inflict emotional distress as
an essential element of Unlawful Exposure infuses motive
into the criminal act.22 Assault, domestic assault, rape, and
virtually all other victim crimes do not require motive as an
element.23
In these statutes, the mens rea term of
“intentional” applies to the act itself, not the motivation
behind the act. Even first degree murder, arguably the most
egregious act that can be committed upon another, expressly
disclaims a “culpable mental state” unless prosecuting as a
premeditated and intentional killing.24 Victim crimes,
including Unlawful Exposure, should not force the victim to
prove the motivations of the defendant—only that the act
was committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
Burdening a victim of nonconsensual pornography to prove a
Asia A. Eaton et al., 2017 Nationwide Online Study of Nonconsensual
Porn Victimization and
Perpetration: A Summary Report, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE 11 (June 12,
2017), 4.
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017Research-Report.pdf
21 Id. at 19.
22 Mary A. Franks, Drafting an Effective “Revenge Porn” Law: A Guide
for Legislators, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS, 7-8.
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/guide-to-legislation (last visited May 17,
2019).
23 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-111
(2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-503 (2005).
24 Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202 (2019).
20
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defendant’s motive serves to undermine and trivialize
protection from a crime into determining why the crime was
committed.25

B. “INTIMATE PART OR PARTS OF ANOTHER”
Unlawful Exposure defines “intimate parts” within the
statutory language as:
[A]ny portion of the primary genital area,
buttock, or any portion of the female breast
below the top of the areola that is either
uncovered or visible through less than fully
opaque clothing.26
A specific gap within the prosecution of the Tennessee
law stems from failing to address the depiction of sexual acts
in Unlawful Exposure. As in the case of “Blake,” a readily
identifiable victim engaged in a sexual act is not addressed
by the current wording of the statute. The intimate part
shown in the photograph (defendant’s penis) was not “of
another.” A defendant can consent ad nauseam to publishing
their own private parts. Beyond running afoul of other laws,
there is no Unlawful Exposure restriction to sharing one’s
own sexually explicit or intimate pictures. Yet, victims can
experience the “significant mental suffering” required by the
statute even when the nudity is not their own. Victims can
endure
psychological
impact
from
nonconsensual
pornography through loss of opportunities (work, education,
intimacy), trauma from threats or taunts, humiliation, and
heightened risk of suicide.27
The vast majority of states having nonconsensual
pornography statutes include language covering the
depiction of sexual acts under the umbrella of the law.28
Cynthia J. Najdowski, Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Pornography:
Current Policy in the United States and Future Directions for Research,
23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 154, 155 (2017).
26 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-318(b)(2) (2016).
27 Mary Anne Franks, "Revenge Porn" Reform: A View from the Front
Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1285
(2017).
28 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-240; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.120; ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1425; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-314; CAL. PENAL CODE §
25

8

9 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2022)

Many of those statutes expressly define specific sexual
actions to protect against misunderstanding and attacks on
vagueness. Here again, Illinois uses pointed language to
include
sexual
acts,
sexual
activity,
and
visible ejaculate on the victim.
“Sexual act” means sexual penetration,
masturbation, or sexual activity.
“Sexual activity” means any:
(1) knowing touching or fondling by the victim
or another person or animal, either directly or
through clothing, of the sex organs, anus, or
breast of the victim or another person or
animal for the purpose of sexual gratification
or arousal; or
(2) any transfer or transmission of semen upon
any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the
victim, for the purpose of sexual gratification
or arousal of the victim or another; or
(3) an act of urination within a sexual context;
or
(4) any bondage, fetter, or sadism masochism;
or
(5) sadomasochism abuse in any sexual
647(j)(4); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A189C; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 1335; D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3051; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 784.049; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
711-1110.9; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1123.5; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-8; IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-6101; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.120; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §
511-A; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-809; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.145e; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.261; MO. ANN. STAT. § 573.110; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-213; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-311.08; NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.770; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:9-a; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37A-1; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.15; N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-190.5A; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17-07.2; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2917.211; OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 1040.13b; OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 163.472; 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3131; 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-64-3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-4; TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.16; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203; VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 2606;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.86.010; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-28a; WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 942.09; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-306.
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context.29
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have included
language that covers sexual acts under their respective
nonconsensual pornography laws. Tennessee provides its
citizenry, including “Blake,” no such protection.30

C. “IDENTIFIABLE PERSON”
“Blake” performing a sexual act was unprotected by
Tennessee’s Unlawful Exposure law despite her
identifiability in the picture itself. However, “Alex” was
reduced to a mere body part and not strictly identifiable
within the four corners of the image. The defendant
identified “Alex” when she was named in distributing the
image to her family and workplace. Thus, “Alex’s” anus,
pruriently published to her close community, was therefore
no longer unidentifiable even where her face was not part of
the picture.
The Unlawful Exposure law does not define
“identifiable” within the statute. Other states include
language that clarify identifying factors can occur from
within the image itself or from information transmitted
along with the image. The Illinois statute provides express
language perceiving that an individual may be identified
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23.5(a) (2015).
See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-240; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.120; ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1425; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-314; CAL. PENAL CODE §
647(j)(4); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-107; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A189C; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 1335; D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3051; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 784.049; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
711-1110.9; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6609; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1123.5; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-8; IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.7; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-6101; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.120; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §
511-A; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-809; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.145e; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.261; MO. ANN. STAT. § 573.110; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-213; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-311.08; NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.770; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:9-a; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37A-1; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.15; N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-190.5A; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17-07.2; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2917.211; OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 1040.13b; OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 163.472; 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3131; 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-64-3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-4; TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 21.16; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203; VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 2606;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.86.010; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-28a; WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 942.09; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-306.
29
30
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through other means than recognition within the picture
itself:
(1) intentionally disseminates an image of
another person:
...
(B) who is identifiable from the image itself or
information displayed in connection with the
image.31
As Tennessee does not define “identifiability” within
its statute, the language does not clarify if the identifiable
nature of the person must come from the image itself. An
individual may be recognized by the characteristics of their
face or other physical features, tattoos, piercings, scars,
hairstyle,
clothing,
etc.
Law
enforcement
have
systematically used tattoo and trait data collection since the
1800s in England.32 What is unclear, and not within the four
corners of the statute, is the use of extrinsic information to
identify a person within a photograph.
If a disgruntled former intimate partner shares an
image of a victim’s genitals, buttocks, or breasts as
disembodied parts, there is generally little to identify them
as belonging to a particular person. Attributes such as
pigmentation, size, or other characteristics are not readily
known to the general public or one’s social circle and would
be unlikely to assert identifiability. However, should the
same former partner include the caption, “That no good
cheating rat, ex-boyfriend,” the identifiability factor
increases significantly. Certainly one’s friends, family, work
colleagues, neighbors, and other parties would have a much
higher likelihood of determining the victim’s identity.

1. IDENTIFICATION BY OTHER MEANS
The most expedient way for Tennessee’s Unlawful
Exposure statute to bolster the identifiable person factor is
amending the statute to include “information disseminated
with the image itself,” as Illinois and other states have
codified. Barring such an amendment, a victim should be
allowed to self-identify they are depicted in the image
31
32

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-23.5(b) (2015).
Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1570 (2012).
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distributed without their consent.
Crime scene and forensic photographs often show
close-up views of injuries or body parts that are not strictly
identifiable as a victim’s from the image itself. Tennessee
Rules of Evidence allow identification of evidence to be
determined from authentication by a witness or an unbroken
chain of custody.33 “Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge”
is expressly stated as an authentication example that
conforms with the requirements of the rule.34 Where a victim
can authenticate the identity of stolen items as belonging to
him, so too should a victim of Unlawful Exposure be able to
authenticate he or she is shown in an intimate picture.35
Within the Advisory Notes (7. Photographs) of Tenn. R. Evid.
901, a case is referenced regarding the admissibility of
photographs and evidence of identity stating:
We . . . conclude that the jury appropriately
could have considered the photographs as
evidence of identity, despite the State's failure
to present proof that the person in the
photographs is the defendant. Photographs,
such as those admitted in this case, have been
described as recorded real evidence. Cohen,
Paine & Sheppeard, Tennessee Law of
Evidence, § 401.9, p. 83 (2d Ed.1990). If
properly authenticated, such recordings
constitute real evidence from which a trier of
fact is able to draw a firsthand sense
impression of the facts, as opposed to evidence
which serves merely to report to the trier of
fact the secondhand sense impression of
others. Id. at p. 82; see also Strong, 2
McCormick On Evidence, § 212, p. 3 (4th
Ed.1992); Graham, Handbook of Federal
Evidence, § 401.2, p. 147–48 (3rd Ed.1991).36
Where photographs are authenticated as an accurate
Tenn. R. Evid. 901
Id., at (b)(1)
35 See Sneed v. State, 498 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973); State
v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947,
949 (Tenn. 1978).
36 State v. Williams, 913 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Tenn. 1996).
33
34
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portrayal by a witness, jurors may make a first-hand sense
impression with the evidence at hand. Proving identifiability
of the individual in the picture is not a requirement for a jury
to weigh the evidence.

2. “IDENTIFIABLE PERSON” REMOVED FROM
STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The term “identifiable person” is used alone in the
language of Unlawful Exposure, orphaned from any
additional context. However, a similar Tennessee statute
exists on dissemination of private photographs which
provides insight into the importance of language. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-13-605, Photographs; Dissemination, provides
similar protections for individuals whose images were taken
unaware and without their consent (i.e., hidden camera
pictures). Unsuspecting victims of this crime were captured
via concealed cameras. Such photographs would “offend or
embarrass an ordinary person if such person appeared in the
photograph.”37 However, the original wording of the statute
as created in 1994 stated the following:
As used in this section, unless the context
otherwise requires, “photograph” means any
photograph or photographic reproduction, still
or moving, or any videotape or live television
transmission of any individual so that the
individual is readily identifiable [emphasis
added].38
In 2010, the state legislature amended the wording of
the statute noting:
SECTION 2. Tennessee Code Annotated,
Section 39–13–605(b), is amended by deleting
the words “so that the individual is readily

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-605(a)(1) (2018).
INVASION OF PRIVACY, 1994 Tennessee Laws Pub. Ch. 970 (H.B.
2276).
37
38
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identifiable”.39
No discussion was saved within the Session Minutes as to
why the change was enacted, but beginning January 1, 2011,
the new statutory language erasing “readily identifiable”
was enacted into state law.40 The Bill Summary states:
Criminal Offenses - As introduced,
deletes the requirement that a person being
photographed must be readily identifiable in
order
for
the
offense
of
unlawful
photographing to be committed. - Amends
TCA Title 39.
Under present law, “photograph”
means any photograph or photographic
reproduction, still or moving, or any videotape
or live television transmission of any
individual so that the individual is readily
identifiable.
This
bill
removes
that
requirement that the individual be “readily
identifiable” from the definition of photograph
for purposes of the above described offense.41
The main difference between Unlawful Exposure
(“revenge porn”) and Photographs; Dissemination (“hidden
camera”), predicates on who took the photograph and the
consent of the victim. The expectation of privacy, capture of
intimate photographs, and lack of prior consent to distribute
are similar elements between the two statutes. The
Tennessee General Assembly purposefully removed the
“identifiable” language within the “hidden camera” statute.
While this change does not provide a definition of what
“identifiable” means for Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-318
(“revenge porn”), it does give weight that the legislature
clearly intended to remove the identifiability factor from
intimate pictures taken by another without consent. No
realistic barrier exists where the same standard cannot be
applied to consensual, intimate pictures that are distributed
CRIMES AND OFFENSES--ABUSE--RESIDENTIAL CARE
FACILITIES, 2010 Tennessee Laws
Pub. Ch. 1124 (S.B. 3219).
40 Tennessee Senate Journal, 2010 Reg. Sess. No. 50 (West).
41 Tennessee Bill Summary, 2010 Reg. Sess. S.B. 3219 (West).
39
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without consent.

D. STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES
A survey of the United States notes forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia have enacted nonconsensual
pornography laws in varying capacities.42 These state laws
comprise a hodgepodge of different statutory language
approaches and standards between them, with some states
(notably Illinois) providing model standards for a robust,
meaningful law. Two states without active nonconsensual
pornography statutes are Massachusetts and South
Carolina.43 No Federal law currently offers protection for
nonconsensual pornography victims.44

III. CURING PROBLEM LANGUAGE IN UNLAWFUL
EXPOSURE
As shown with Tennessee’s “Hidden Camera” law,
amendments can and should be made to statutory language
as problems become evident. Three particular areas within
Tennessee’s Unlawful Exposure statute should be addressed
to improve viability of the law and to provide more
substantive protection to victims who currently fall outside
the range of the plain language, such as “Alex” and “Blake.”

A. “IDENTIFIABLE PERSON” STANDARD
As discussed in previous sections, Tennessee has an
identity problem with the statutory language of “identifiable
person” as a standalone phrase. With no definition within
the law to support context, judges and juries must look to the
plain language when weighing evidence. Where one judge
has already found it problematic to determine the identity of
the victim outside the four corners of the image, it is
axiomatic other judges could find they are also limited. There
are no appellate rulings to provide the context and contour
of the law other than how it is written.
Self-identity and authentication of images under
CCRI., supra note 3.
Id.
44 Franks, supra note 27, at 1293-1294.
42
43
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Tenn. R. Evid. 901 and previously noted case law could
provide an avenue for judges to allow introduction of the
evidence, but judges could also as easily determine plain
statutory language trumps the evidentiary rule. Far better
for an amendment to the Unlawful Exposure law clarify
“identifiable person” and expand the language to include
identifying information accompanying the distributed
image. With such an expansion of the language, “Alex” and
others in similar situations would be more likely to receive
realistic protection under this law.
Co-opting the Cyber Civil Rights Institute’s (CCRI)
Model State Law, the change from the current statutory
language could be as simple as updating “identifiable person”
to “another person who is identifiable from the image itself
or information displayed in connection with the image.”45
This adjustment would help ensure that random body parts
and headless torsos in intimate images can identify victims
without relying solely on the image itself, but also by the
names or relationships established in words or symbols
transmitted along with the picture.

B. EXPAND LANGUAGE TO INCLUDE SEXUAL ACTS
It is incomprehensible that sexual acts are markedly
absent from the Unlawful Exposure language, however
Tennessee is not the only state to lapse their duty to protect
victims in this manner. Indeed, nearly all states who have
nonconsensual pornography laws do include sexual acts and
activity language, placing Tennessee in a tiny, ignominious
minority along with Louisiana and Virginia.46
As with the identifiable person factor, the addition of
language to the statute is a comparatively easy change, but
one which is absolutely vital. Tennessee’s unlawful exposure
law currently has a huge gap where sexual acts are not
expressly covered in the statute. CCRI’s Model State Law
suggests “‘Sexual act’ includes but is not limited to
masturbation; genital, anal, or oral sex; sexual penetration
with objects; or the transfer or transmission of semen upon
any part of the depicted person’s body.” 47
Id., at 10.
supra note 28
47 Franks, supra note 22, at 11.
45
46
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C. MENS REA AND MOTIVE
Unlawful Exposure requires the victim prove a
defendant’s intent to cause significant emotional distress as
an essential element. This element can be a prohibitive bar
where a victim must substantiate a defendant’s thoughts or
intentions when distributing nonconsensual pornography. A
victim should not be required to establish an emotional
injury where the true harm is to their privacy. CCRI
suggests a standard where the actor “knows or recklessly
disregard[s] the risk that the depicted person has not
consented to such disclosure.”48
Utah passed their original Distribution of an
Intimate Image law in 2014.49 In 2019, Utah passed an
amendment curing the problematic “intentional” language.
“This bill: changes the intent provisions for the crime of
distribution of an intimate image from intent to cause
emotional distress to knowing that the distribution would
cause a reasonable person emotional distress.”50
Tennessee could amend the current Unlawful
Exposure law with similar wording with either of the
referenced changes above. That action would remove the
burden of proving a defendant’s “intent to harm,” and retire
the trope that victims must suffer in order to have their
privacy violated.

IV. CONCLUSION
Tennessee has joined the majority of states providing
some protection for nonconsensual pornography to victims.
Victims have an avenue to pursue justice where they have
been wronged by “revenge porn.” However, many other
victims are left without recourse where the statutory
language simply does not cover their specific situations.
Tennessee has the ability to cure these deficiencies in the
law through the amendment process, and provide a robust,
protective law that may give victims peace of mind and
Id.
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5b-203 (2014).
50 CRIMINAL CODE AMENDMENTS, 2019 Utah Laws H.B. 270 (West's
No. 376)
48
49
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defendants a healthy reason to pause before pushing send.
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APPENDIX

Suggestions to amend Tennessee Code Annotated Section 3917-318, relative to criminal offenses. Strikethrough text of
original statutory language along with the italicized text of
appended language.
(a) A person commits unlawful exposure who, with the intent
to cause emotional distress knowing that the distribution
would cause a reasonable person emotional distress,
knowingly or recklessly distributes an image of the intimate
part or parts of another identifiable person if:
(1) Where the image was photographed or recorded
under circumstances where the parties agreed or
understood that the image would remain private; and
(2) Who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate
part or parts are exposed. The person depicted in the
image suffers emotional distress
(b) As used in this section:
(1) “Emotional distress” has the same meaning as
defined in § 39-17-315; and
(2) “Intimate part” means any portion of the primary
genital area, buttock, anus, or any portion of the
female breast below the top of the areola that is either
uncovered or visible through less than fully opaque
clothing.
(3) “Identifiable person” is a person who is identifiable
from the image itself or information displayed in
connection with the image.
(4) “Sexual act” includes but is not limited to
masturbation; genital, anal, or oral sex; sexual
penetration with objects; or the transfer or
transmission of semen upon any part of the depicted
person’s body
.
(c) Nothing in this section precludes punishment under any
other section of law providing for greater punishment or any
applicable civil action.
(d) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor.
(e) Exceptions: This section does not apply to
(1) Images involving voluntary exposure in public or
commercial settings; or Disclosures made in the public
interest, including but not limited to the reporting of
unlawful conduct, or the lawful and common practices
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of law enforcement, criminal reporting, criminal
proceedings, or legitimate medical purpose.

